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1. Introduction
On	July	17,	2008,	 the	Romanian	newspaper	Cotidianul	carried	on	 its	 front-
page	 under	 the	 headline	 “Fingerprinting	 of	Roma:	A	finger	 for	Berlusconi”	
a	picture	of	a	little	Roma	girl	displaying	an	internationally	well-known	hand	
gesture:	a	downside	up	closed	hand	with	an	outstretched	middle	finger.1
At the time, tensions between Italy and Romania had reached a new high as 
Italy’s	new	right-wing	government	began	to	step	up	its	anti-immigration	and	
anti-crime	policies	in	an	effort	to	assuage	the	Italian	public’s	increasing	concerns	
over	immigrants	and	crime.	One	of	the	final	measures	in	that	effort,	introduced	
in	 late	 spring,	 a	 registration	 of	 Italy’s	Roma	 population	 (dubbed	 a	 census),	
a population including many Romanian citizens, was to be implemented via 
fingerprinting,	which	explicitly	was	also	to	include	minors.2
With	the	European	Commission	giving	its	assent	to	the	Italian	fingerprinting	
scheme in early fall 2008, the issue may appear somewhat moot. The 
Commission,	it	has	been	reported,	declared	itself	satisfied	that	the	fingerprinting	
scheme would only serve in instances where no other means of establishing a 
person’s identity is available.3 And, indeed, since those heady days of summer, 
even Romanian media and public attention to the policy measure have dwindled 
again as well.
Yet	it	bears	to	re-examine	this	intra-EU-European	summer	clash	in	a	larger	
context.	At	 issue	 in	 this	 intra-EU-European	 summer	 clash	was,	 and	 indeed	
continues	to	be,	the	very	meaning	–	and	therefore	the	(potential)	make-up	–	
of	 a	EU-European	 citizenship.	As	 I	will	 argue	 in	 the	 following,	 the	 central	
problem	behind	a	EU-European	citizenship,	as	evidenced	in	the	summer	clash	
between	 Italy	and	Romania,	 lies	 in	 the	fissures	between	 the	construction	of	
citizenship	as	a	political	 identity	defined	by	a	nationally-framed	“state”	and	
“Europe”	as	topos	of	a	historical-cultural	and	normative	identity	claim.	To	the	
extent that the EU continues to be associated not with protective functions and 
its	enabling	functions	(which	grant	positive,	as	opposed	to	negative	rights)	have	
become	associated	with	“externalized”	threats,	a	EU-European	citizenship	will	
1	 	The	line	“offri	un	dito	a	Maroni”	(the	reference	is	to	Roberto	Maroni,	Northern	League,	interior	
minister in the new Berlusconi government) is below the picture. The title page is available at 
http://www.cotidianul.ro/img/editions/pdf/editia_2008-07-17.pdf.
2	 	“Berlusconi	unveils	anti-crime	measures	for	Italy”,	International	Herald	Tribune,	May	21,	2008;	
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/05/21/europe/italy.php; last accessed: September 13, 2008.
3	 	“EU	gives	blessing	for	Italy’s	Roma	fingerprinting	scheme”,	EUobserver,	September	5,	2008;	
http://euobserver.com/22/26691;	last	accessed:	September	13,	2008.	“L’UE:	‘Le	misure	italiane	
sui	rom	non	sono	discriminatorie’”,	Corriere	della	Sera,	September	4,	2008;	http://www.corriere.
it/politica/08_settembre_04/nomadi_ue_misure_c277b0f0-7a70-11dd-a3dd-00144f02aabc.shtml.
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continue	to	remain	a	mere	formal	sum	of	its	substantive,	namely	member-state	
based, parts. That the normative invocation of a common European identity at 
the moment appears less and less able to muster the force necessary to check 
the	political	allure	of	a	return	to	the	strong	nationally-framed	protective	state	is	
therefore part and parcel of the larger crisis of institutional reform that presently 
defines	the	EU-European	project	of	regional	integration.
The	following	critical	analysis	of	the	present	state	(pun	intended)	of	a	EU-
European citizenship in the light of the noted summer clash is divided into 
two	 parts	 (2.	 and	 3.).	After	 providing	 an	 explication	 of	 the	 problematic	 of	
citizenship	and	situating	 this	problematic	within	 its	European	context	(2.),	 I	
address Berlusconi’s role in Italian politics today and analyze the vision behind 
the	security	measures	(2.1);	this	is	followed	by	a	discussion	of	the	Roma	as	
a	 paradigmatically	 European,	 namely,	 non-national	 group	 (2.2);	 then	 I	 turn	
to	 the	 (ethnic)	Romanian	 (political)	 insecurities	about	both	a	national	and	a	
European	identity	(2.3).	The	third	part	discusses	the	project	of	a	EU-European	
citizenship	in	the	light	of	the	fissures	between	the	construction	of	citizenship	
as	a	political	identity	defined	by	a	nationally-framed	“state”	and	“Europe”	as	
topos	of	a	historical-cultural	and	normative	identity	claim	(3.).	Again,	the	very	
elements of the summer clash between Italy and Romania are indicative of a 
EU-European	citizenship:	its	problems,	prospects,	and	promise.
2. European Citizenship as Contested Terrain
Citizenship arguably has become the central watchword of European integration 
in	recent	years.	The	well-known	diagnosis	of	a	democratic	“deficit”	ailing	the	
European Union could not live without it in both its analysis and prescription. 
At issue in that diagnosis is the lack of institutional representation offered to a 
European	public,	as	European	integration	has	remained	an	elite-level	project	
both in design and execution. It is the absence of such institutional representation 
that	(in	this	view)	accounts	for	the	(increasing	and/or	sustained)	Euroscepticism	
among member states’ publics. To put it sharply, while an emerging European 
public can be seen in the abstract via a common political space, this public 
unfortunately	has	 institutionally	nowhere	 to	go	but	 (ironically)	 to	 blame	 an	
abstract	“Brussels”	for	its	predicament	(Gabel	and	Anderson	2004).
At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 meaning	 of	 “citizenship”	 itself	 has	 become	 an	
item of much debate in the political and social sciences. It has become quite 
commonplace in the literature to distinguish two dimensions/meanings of 
citizenship.	On	 the	 one	 hand,	 citizenship	 is	 a	 legal-administrative	 construct	
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of	“belonging”.	While	granting	certain	rights	or	privileges	and	affixing	certain	
responsibilities,	it	is	tied	to	a	specific	–	legitimate	and	sovereign	–	state	entity.	
Citizenship	 here	 always	 has	 its	 own	 place	 –	 a	 territorially	 defined	 political	
community – and as such cannot be seen as devoid of a concrete political 
space	(hence:	debates	about	migration	and	citizenship	in	terms	of	how	open	
a	polity	is	to	migration	and	how	it	defines	the	rights	of	non-members	or	not-
yet	members).	On	the	other	hand,	and	setting	itself	against	the	former	view,	
citizenship has also become emphasized as a normative claim towards both 
emancipation and participation in any community or societal context; a 
claim	 that	 in	 the	final	 instance	 recognizes	 all	 humans	 as	 global	 citizens.	 In	
this	 cosmopolitan	 conception,	 the	 values	 (rights	 and	 –	 to	 a	 lesser	 degree	 –	
responsibilities)	that	underlie	and	animate	citizenship	are	neither	defined	nor	
contained	by	any	territorial	political	entity,	let	alone	by	the	concept	of	a	nation-
state	(Nash	2007;	Wagner	2007).
The European Union and by implication the entire process of European 
integration in this sense can be seen as articulating those dual meanings of 
citizenship. Indeed, depending on which side of the fence, so to speak, one 
might wish to champion, the Union and European integration either fall 
short	of	 realizing	 (hence:	 a	democratic	deficit)	or	 actually	come	 to	embody	
“citizenship”	 (Delanty	 2007).	 It	 is	 therefore	 not	 far	 fetched	 to	 define	 EU-
European citizenship as contested terrain: contested between two modes of 
belonging,	the	communitarian-national	and	the	cosmopolitan-global,	thereby	
expressing a struggle over the very meaning of European integration itself.
For	the	present	purpose	of	explicating	a	European	citizenship	as	contested	
terrain	 in	 this	 sense,	 it	 suffices	 to	 take	 a	 look	 at	 the	 European	 Union’s	
formulation	 of	 citizenship	 in	 the	 Treaties	 (the	 foundational	 law	 and	 legal	
framework	of	the	Union).	Here	is	the	relevant	formulation	from	the	so-called	
Treaty	of	Nice,	which	at	 the	 time	of	 this	writing	continues	 to	be	 the	Union	
framework in operation today:
	 “Citizenship	of	the	Union	shall	complement	and	not	replace	national	citizenship”		
	 [Article	17	TEC]	(European	Union	2006).
If	 and	when	 the	 revision	 signed	 in	 Lisbon	 in	 2007	 (the	 Lisbon	 or	 Reform	
Treaty), the revision made in response to the failed Constitutional effort, comes 
into	effect	(2009),	the	relevant	passage	will	be	the	following:
 “Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national 
	 citizenship”	[Article	20	FEU]	(Council	of	the	European	Union	2008).4
4	 	“EU	gives	blessing	for	Italy’s	Roma	fingerprinting	scheme”,	EUobserver,	September	5,	2008;	
http://euobserver.com/22/26691;	last	accessed:	September	13,	2008.	“L’UE:	‘Le	misure	italiane	
“A Finger for Berlusconi”: Italy’s anti-immigration/anti-crime measures, 
Romanian realities, and the poverty of European citizenship
PIFO Occasional Papers No. 4/2009 | Seite 8
In	the	first	place	it	is	interesting	to	note	that	“complement”	has	been	replaced	
by	“additional”	in	the	Reform	Treaty.	Complement	suggests	completion:	that	
something	 is	 missing	 from	 the	 latter	 (national	 citizenship)	 that	 the	 former	
(citizenship	 of	 the	 Union)	 remedies.	 Exactly	 this	 suggestion	 of	 national	
incompleteness has been taken away by the formulation in the Reform Treaty: 
as additional, EU citizenship serves the function of the cherry on top of a cake.5 
What might appear as splitting hairs needs to be seen in the context of what 
were	tough	negotiations	in	the	wake	of	a	failed	“Constitutional”	attempt.	One	
of	 the	 central	 issues	 in	 those	 negotiations	 (and	 one	 of	 the	 reasons	why	 the	
Reform	Treaty	was	 rejected	 in	 the	 Irish	 referendum)	was	 the	 concern	 over	
the	 creation	of	 a	European	 (EU)	“super-state”.	Key	 in	 the	negotiations	was	
to rescue what could be rescued from the failed Constitutional Treaty while 
assuaging national concerns. Thus, the Reform Treaty does pay tribute to 
subsidiarity, to an increasing role of the European and the national Parliaments 
–	and,	one	can	surmise,	toned	down	the	language	of	a	EU-European	citizenship	
in	favor	of	firmly	signaling	that	citizenship	was	to	remain	the	prerogative	of	
each national member state.6
This reformulation of the citizenship clause – again: at the time of this 
writing the fate of the Reform Treaty remains unclear – here only serves to 
emphasize	 the	 larger	 point:	 from	a	 formal-legal	 standpoint,	 a	EU-European	
citizenship	 does	 not	 exist.	One	 is	 a	 citizen	 of	 a	member	 state	 and	 only	 by	
virtue of the respective state being a member state of the European Union can 
a	citizen	consider	him	or	herself	a	citizen	of	the	EU	(any	EU	passport	will	tell	
that story: the issuing authority is no EU bureaucracy…).
However,	it	would	be	wrong	simply	to	conclude	that	absent	such	formal-
legal	claim	and	recognition,	no	EU-European	dimension	to	citizenship	exists.	
Much like the rest of European integration, namely, the creation of what some 
scholars	have	dubbed	“multi-level	governance”,	a	considerable	EU-European	
dimension	 to	 citizenship	has	 come	about	by	 “stealth”:	 through	 the	 fact	 that	
fundamental	 normative	 commitments	 (including	 the	 four	 freedoms	 and	 the	
common	market)	were	 transformed	 into	concrete	policies	and	 the	 spill-over	
sui	rom	non	sono	discriminatorie’”,	Corriere	della	Sera,	September	4,	2008;	http://www.corriere.
it/politica/08_settembre_04/nomadi_ue_misure_c277b0f0-7a70-11dd-a3dd-00144f02aabc.shtml.
5  The point remains even when looking into different language versions. 1) TEC in German: 
“ergänzt	…,	ersetzt	sie	aber	nicht”;	in	Italian:	“un	complemento	…	e	non	sostituisce	quest’ultima”;	
in	French:	“complete	…	et	ne	la	remplace	pas”;	[no	official	text	in	Romanian].	2)	FEU	in	German:	
“tritt	…	hinzu,	ersetzt	sie	aber	nicht”;	in	Italian:	“si	aggiunge	…	e	non	sostituisce	quest’ultima”;	in	
French:	“s’ajoute	…	et	ne	la	remplace	pas”;	in	Romanian:	“nu	inlocueste	…,	ci	se	adauga”.
6  The latter is of course an empirical question, and I hope to have an answer to it relatively 
soon.
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effect	of	such	policies	into	other	policy-areas;	backed	initially	and	subsequently	
by	 the	 accepted	 and	 legally-enforceable	 doctrine	 of	 “direct	 effect”	 of	 EU	
regulations	(Kohler-Koch,	Conzelmann,	Knodt	2004;	Majone	2005).
The dimension of EU citizenship that has thusly emerged “has grown out 
of	the	rights	of	Community	nationals	to	free	movement	as	economic	actors”	
(Guild	2004,	p.	82).	As	workers	within	a	unified	market	area	(the	EU’s	common	
market),	citizens	of	EU	member	states	enjoy	the	right	to	free	movement	and	
residency	within	 the	entire	EU	area.	Like	goods,	people	have	become	freed	
in this sense. Yet exactly this process – another part of what has come to be 
viewed	 as	 “integration	 through	 law”	–	 has	 also	 come	 to	 confine	 the	 notion	
of	 EU	 citizenship	 in	 two	 important	ways.	 In	 the	 first	 place,	member	 states	
have	retained	the	right	to	define	that	freedom	and	confine	residency,	including	
in fact the use of deportation, by virtue of an acknowledged public policy 
prerogative based, in the last instance, on notions of public safety and security. 
Non-national	residents,	in	short,	can	be	treated	differently	than	nationals	by	a	
member	state.	This	difference	(for	example	restricting	the	freedom	of	movement	
of	a	non-national	within	the	territory	of	a	member	state)	also	accounts	for	the	
fact	that	administrative	law	is	allowed	to	apply	to	non-nationals	in	instances	
where	criminal	 law	 (and	 its	procedural	protections)	would	have	 to	 apply	 to	
nationals	(Guild	2004,	pp.	89-91).	One	should	also	note	 that	 in	 the	cases	of	
the late Eastern enlargement entrants, Romania and Bulgaria, a labor market 
safe guard clause in the ascension treaties has effectively curtailed the freedom 
of movement and residency by restricting Bulgarian and Romanian workers’ 
access to the labor markets in most of the older member states.7	Furthermore,	
the	vision	of	a	EU	citizenship	as	a	potential	“source	of	rights”	(N.	Reich)	in	
reality continues to lack the social dimension, the social rights associated with 
citizenship	today.	Once	again,	the	noted	national	prerogative	when	it	comes	to	
public	policy	making	has	“structurally	constrained”	the	development	of	a	EU	
citizenship	(Aziz	2004,	p.	112).
Nevertheless,	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 the	 common	 market	 rule	 of	 “non-
discrimination”	has	begun	to	determine	the	actions	and	interactions	of	member	
states	when	it	comes	to	their	peoples	(nationals	and	non-nationals	alike)	and	
the fact that social services and social insurance are made available across the 
EU territory regardless of nationality and residency, one is able to note the 
slow	development	of	a	EU-European	social	space,	a	EU-European	society,	if	
you will. Add to this the continuing pressures in the services and taxation areas 
7	 	At	 the	 time	 of	 this	writing,	 the	 restrictions	 continue	 to	 exist	 in	 the	UK,	 Ireland,	Germany,	
Austria,	Luxembourg,	Netherlands,	and	Belgium	for	another	three	years.	“Three	EU	states	open	up	
to	Bulgarian,	Romanian	workers”,	EUobserver,	January	2,	2009;	http://euobserver.com/9/27339.
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for	increasing	coordination	and	unification	via	either	harmonization	or	at	least	
mutual	recognition	of	standards	and	services,	and	an	evolving	EU-European	
dimension	of	citizenship,	despite	set-backs,	cannot	be	denied.
Thus,	what	has	emerged	since	 the	 founding	of	 the	Union	(Communities)	
in	regards	to	citizenship	reflects	the	integration	problematic	itself.	The	notion	
of	citizenship	 shares	with	 the	proclaimed	 ideal	of	 an	“ever	closer	Union”	a	
contradictory and enabling dynamic. Contradictory, because the key to the 
development of both continues to lie with each national member state. Enabling, 
because the dynamic of integration exposes and transcends the limits of the 
nation	state	as	the	existing	form	of	political	community	(the	polity)	today.
It is this dynamic that the reader should keep in mind as we begin to discuss 
the concrete case in question. Beginning with contemporary Italian politics, 
we will see that the assertion of the national state principle increasingly 
reflects	rather	anachronistic	conceptions	of	the	relationship	between	state	and	
citizenship.	Furthermore,	while	 national	 state	 actors	find	 themselves	 caught	
in	 a	 EU-European	 web	 of	 their	 own	 making,	 non-national	 (sub-national	
and	 transnational)	 actors	 are	 finding	 it	 increasingly	 enabling,	 not	 to	 say	
emancipatory, to rely on European integration as both a normative reference 
point and a policy context.
2.1 Bringing the State back in – Berlusconi style
On	April	 13-14,	 2008,	 the	 Italian	 electorate	voted	with	 a	 clear	majority	 for	
Silvio	Berlusconi	and	his	new	party,	The	People	of	Freedom	(Il	Popolo	della	
Libertà;	PDL),	and	even	provided	the	Berlusconi	led	party	alliance,	consisting	
of	The	People	of	Freedom,	Northern	League	(Lega	Nord)	and	the	new	Sicilian	
Movement	 for	Autonomy	 (Movimento	 per	 l’Autonomia	 del	 Sud),	 with	 an	
overwhelming	victory	and	clear	majorities	in	both	Chamber	of	Deputies	and	
the Senate. Silvio Berlusconi, thus, now leads for the third time as elected 
Prime	Minister	an	Italian	government	(Grasse	2008).
It is fair to say that most of the rest of Europe’s public opinion greeted the 
Berlusconi	IV	government	(IV	because	of	the	reformation	of	the	government	
without new elections in 2005) with an exhausted and befuddled sigh of “not 
again”.	Ever	since	Silvio	Berlusconi	appeared	as	a	serious	contender	for	the	
Prime	Minister	office	on	the	Italian	political	scene,	his	attraction,	his	victories,	
and	his	 comportment	 in	office	have	 led	 to	 serious	questions	 about	 the	 state	
of Italian democracy. Berlusconi’s rise as entrepreneur – he is now one of 
the richest Italians and, arguably most importantly, the owner of Italy’s most 
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private	television	stations	–	has	been	attributed	by	some	to	Mafia	connections.	
Since the 1990s, he has been dogged by various corruption charges and 
attempts at prosecution. Indeed, his late calling as politician has been seen 
by critical observers as an attempt, and a successful one at that, to stave off 
prosecution	 first	 via	 immunity	 and	 finally	 by	 rewriting	 laws.	 His	 gaffes	 in	
office,	 in	 turn,	 have	 become	 quite	 legendary.	Arguably	 the	most	 legendary	
one	occurred	during	a	session	in	the	European	Parliament	when	he	“jokingly”	
told the German social democratic/socialist MP, Martin Schulz, who had 
questioned Berlusconi’s democratic credentials, that he, Schulz, would make a 
great	overseer	(Kapo	or	capo)	of	a	concentration	camp.
The	 disastrous	 session	 in	 the	 European	 Parliament	 (as	 Italy’s	 Prime	
Minister, Berlusconi then held the rotating Presidency of the EU Council) 
points to the most important question mark surrounding Berlusconi’s political 
role.	His	business	dealings	and	behavior	in	office	are	in	fact	the	least	of	his	
critics’	concerns.	From	the	very	beginning,	his	political	party,	‘Forward	Italy’	
(Forza	Italia),	was	not	just	a	vehicle	for	his	own	personal	ambitions.	Berlusconi	
clearly positioned himself and his movement on the right of Italy’s political 
spectrum.	From	the	very	beginning	–	Berlusconi	I	–	he	relied	on	a	coalition	
with	Italy’s	two	major	right	wing	parties:	the	(regional)	Northern	League	of	
Umberto	Bossi	and	the	National	Alliance	(Alleanza	Nazionale),	whose	main	
founding	 component	was	 the	 Italian	Social	Movement	 (Movimento	Sociale	
Italiano)	 of	 former	Mussolini	 supporters,	with	Gianfranco	Fini	 at	 the	helm.	
For	 the	 2008	 elections,	 Berlusconi’s	 Forza	 and	 Fini’s	Alleanza	 created	 the	
PDL	as	an	electoral	alliance,	but	with	the	prospect	(now	scheduled	for	March	
2009) of creating a new party out of it. It is this clear positioning on the right, 
including	neo-populist,	even	neo-fascist	elements	and	dimensions,	that	has	led	
critical observers to sound an alarm regarding Italian democracy and that has 
led	many	European	politicians,	 including	center-right	conservatives,	 to	keep	
their distance.8
There are of course many explanations for Berlusconi’s rise and subsequent 
victories	in	Italian	politics.	His	rise	and	prominence	in	Italian	politics	can	be	
seen as a result of the collapse of the Italian political party system in the wake 
of	the	large-scale	corruption	scandal,	the	massive	popular	protests	against	and	
judicial	investigations	into	political	corruption	(Mani	Pulite)	that	gripped	Italy	
in the very early 1990s. In this sense, Berlusconi initially used the opportunity 
that the crisis in Italian politics offered at the time and many Italians reacted 
positively to him and his candidacy precisely because both his wealth and his 
8	 	It	should	be	noted	 that	while	Fini	has	managed	to	disassociate	 the	Alleanza	from	its	 fascist	
roots,	the	PDL	continues	to	have	far	right	currents	and	members	in	it.
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political outsider status were seen as signs of independence from a corrupt 
system and as guarantors of a new beginning. As noted by Alexander Grasse in 
assessing Berlusconi’s third victory,
	 [Berlusconi’s]	still	unresolved	conflict	of	interest	between	his	political,	mass		
	 media,	and	business	interests	is	viewed	by	many	[Italians]	not	as	a	problem,	
	 but	instead	as	the	very	guarantor	of	stability	and	decision-making	power	–	and	
	 thus	as	the	solution	to	the	problems	(Grasse	2008,	p.	58).
Yet the problems alluded to by Grasse in the above are not the continuing 
problems of the Italian political system itself and are not directly related to the 
Italian publics’ continuing disappointment in its political class. Berlusconi’s 
third victory, I like to argue instead, is the result of a profound sense of insecurity 
associated with social and economic transformations and challenges that the 
Italian	society	is	facing	today.	In	the	first	place,	accounting	for	Berlusconi’s	
third victory by pointing to the continuing disenchantment of the Italian 
populace with the political system as such appears less convincing because 
80.5 percent of the Italian electorate still went to the polls. While certainly not 
a sign of reigning satisfaction when considering that Italian elections once upon 
a time used to have a participation rate of 89 percent, 80 percent is still a far cry 
from	the	kind	of	disengagement-levels	one	finds	in	other	European	countries,	
let	alone	the	United	States	of	America	(Grasse	2008,	p.	55).9	Furthermore,	it	is	
also remarkable that the combination of Parliamentary, regional, and municipal 
elections	on	the	same	day	did	not	favor,	as	was	expected,	the	Left.	Berlusconi’s	
PDL	was	especially	strong	in	Italy’s	south	and	also	was	able	to	be	victorious	in	
the	region	of	Friuli-Venezia	Giulia	and	won	the	mayor	position	for	the	city	of	
Rome	(Grasse	2008,	p.	57).	Indeed,	judged	by	analysts’	expectations	and	also	
by an outwardly lackluster campaign, Berlusconi’s third victory must appear 
in its clarity as quite a surprise.
Again, if one wishes to account for Berlusconi’s third victory – and 
arguably for the role that Berlusconi plays in Italian politics today – pointing 
to a crisis of the political system and its politics as usual, although such a crisis 
9	 	Even	the	much-touted	(historically	significant	and	internationally	admired)	2008	Presidential	
election in the United States, while drawing the highest turnout in forty years, amounted only to a 
61.1	percent	electoral	participation	rate	(and	as	a	side	note:	the	popular	vote	for	Barack	Obama	was	
essentially	53	percent	of	votes	cast).	Megan	Thee-Brenan,	“Election	drew	highest	turnout	in	40	
years”,	The	Caucus	Blog,	The	New	York	Times,	December	15,	2008;	http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.
com/2008/12/15/election-drew-highest-turnout-in-40-years/?scp=1&sq=Presidential%20
election%202008%20voter%20turnout&st=cse
Election	 results	 2008,	 The	 New	 York	 Times,	 November	 14,	 2008;	 http://elections.nytimes.
com/2008/results/president/explorer.html.
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exists,	does	not	provide	the	necessary	leverage.	One	needs	to	link	the	surface	
(Berlusconi)	to	the	deeper	currents	that	at	present	animate	Italian	concerns.	In	
public opinion surveys, Italians regularly claimed unemployment, low wages, 
and	high	taxes	as	central	concerns.	The	central	issue	for	the	majority	of	Italians	
(arguably:	 the	 average	 Italian)	 can	 be	 summed	up	 as	 a	 concern	with	 social	
and economic security in an economically adverse environment saddled with a 
public	environment	that	is	seen	as	corrupt	and	inefficient.
This structural problematic and its concomitant feeling of insecurity gained 
some	concrete	“faces”	during	2007-2008.	Corruption	and	inefficiency	became	
enshrined in the sprawling garbage heaps lining the curbs and spilling into the 
streets	of	Italy’s	southern	towns	and	cities	including,	most	famously,	Naples.	
Another	representation	became	the	murder	of	a	47-year-old	Italian	woman	by	
a	young	Rom	on	October	30,	2007.	Suddenly,	 the	 issue	of	 immigrants,	and	
especially of Italy’s Roma population, gained a heightened urgency and Italian 
citizens	(and	the	tabloid	press)	began	to	ask	questions	in	terms	of	“us”	versus	
“them”.	Walter	Veltroni,	then	mayor	of	Rome	where	the	murder	had	occurred	
and	who	would	soon	become	the	national	candidate	of	the	Center-Left	coalition	
in	the	elections,	coined	the	term	“Romania	emergency”	and	warned	Romania	
that	if	 it	wanted	to	remain	in	the	European	Union	it	should	stop	the	flow	of	
those	immigrants.	At	least	one	attack	on	Roma	by	neo-fascists	was	reported	
in	the	international	press	as	immediate	reaction	to	the	October	murder.10 That 
Italy	has	become	one	of	the	major	destinations	for	Romanians	(already	in	the	
past but now in the context of EU membership and with Italy one of the few 
older EU members granting full freedom of movement), that Italy has a Roma 
population,	that	extreme	poverty	exists	and	encourages	(mostly	petty)	crime,	
and that Italy is also one of the central destinations for illegal immigration 
to	Europe	(south/southeastern	route	via	the	greater	Mediterranean	area),	and	
last but not least, how migration in general has impacted and transformed 
Italy’s society and economy and the actual plight of most migrant workers – 
all of those rather complex issues and questions suddenly became reduced to a 
security	threat	and	had	a	“face”,	the	Roma	(Andall	2007).
Thus, while insecurity and doubt about Italy’s present state of affairs did not 
rank high themselves in Italians’ responses to questions about their concerns, 
Berlusconi’s third victory is the result of the Italian public’s pronounced 
uneasiness in the face of rather complex challenges. Challenges, one should 
10	 	 Alexander	 Smoltczyk,	 “Italien:	 Krieg	 gegen	 die	 Hütten:	 Nach	 dem	 Mord	 an	 einer	
Spaziergängerin	entdecken	die	Italiener	den	‘Rumänien-Notstand’:	Einwanderer	aus	Südosteuropa,	
die	Dank	großzügiger	Gesetze	im	Land	sind”,	Der	Spiegel,	46/2007	(November	12,	2007);	http://
wissen.spiegel.de/wissen/dokument/dokument-druck.html?id=53621840&top=SPIEGEL.
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note, that are mediated by the Italian Republic’s continuing modernization 
problematic	as	a	national	state	with	two	broad	regional	cleavages,	North	and	
South, yet that are rooted in the contradictory and problematic history of 
modernization in Italy throughout the 20th century.11	While	 the	Democratic	
Party	 (Partito	 Democratico)	 with	 Walter	 Veltroni	 as	 its	 candidate	 actually	
had fundamental change as one of its campaign slogans, such fundamental 
change is neither easy for many Italians to understand nor in fact to condone. 
Berlusconi’s	 personalized	 politics,	 his	 entertainer	 charm	 (or,	 depending	 on	
one’s	view,	his	pathetic	attempts	at	such),	in	this	sense	is	his	major	asset.	Voters	
are	free	to	associate	him,	il	Cavaliere	(the	Knight),	with	their	own	conservative	
longings	and	 to	 remember	only	 the	good	parts	 (such	as	his	 singing	and	 tax	
cuts), while easily blocking out the blunders and the continuing problems.12
And as such, Berlusconi’s third term as elected Prime Minister, like his 
two terms before, advances a rather symbolic politics.13	But	this	“symbolism”	
should not be viewed as without any foundation or purpose. Quite on the 
contrary. Berlusconi’s symbolism is markedly on the far right, emphasizing 
security	versus	 insecurity,	blaming	 the	Left	 for	 everything,	 and	marshalling	
a	vision	(however	ill	defined)	of	Italian	greatness.	In	short,	what	has	already	
been pointed out in the above needs to be emphasized again: Berlusconi has 
decidedly positioned himself on the right in Italian politics and his coalition, 
with	 the	exit	of	Casini’s	Union	of	Christian	and	Center	Democrats	 (Unione	
dei	Democratici	Cristiani	e	di	Centro)	more	so	than	before,	 is	a	coalition	of	
the	Italian	far	right.	(That	this	coalition	is	explainable	and	works	in	terms	of	
the destruction and absence of the organized traditional center, i.e. Christian 
Democracy,	in	contemporary	Italian	politics	is	a	different	story).
At	the	first	cabinet	meeting,	several	policy	measures	were	introduced	that	
combined	aimed	to	present	an	anti-crime	package.	Among	the	measures	were	
tougher immigration laws allowing for the incarceration of illegal immigrants 
and	DNA	testing	of	immigrants	wishing	to	join	family	members	already	living	
in	Italy.	Moreover,	as	the	International	Herald	Tribune	noted,	the	new	measures	
11  There is a distinctly southern European problematic of modernization at work here which 
links in Rokkanian fashion the cleavages of town/country, religious/secular, agrarian/industrial, 
communal/national,	tradition/modernity.	A	problematic	perhaps	best	characterized	as	an	unfinished	
modernization in a postmodern context.
12	 	 In	 attempting	 to	 explain	 Berlusconi	 and	 his	 (strange)	 attraction,	 I	 have	 been	 reminded	
numerous times of former US President Ronald Reagan, which Berlusconi would probably take 
as a great compliment. Both certainly share an appreciation of the theatrical element in politics; 
Berlusconi’s	theater,	however,	is	not	the	Hollywood	sound	stage.
13	 	First	cabinet	meeting	was	held	in	Naples	to	demonstrate	concern	with	the	southern	garbage	
crisis;	one	might	call	the	meeting	an	attempt	at	“consecration”.
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would also negatively affect citizens from other EU member states residing in 
Italy,	as	they	would	now	have	to	prove	that	“they	have	a	job,	health	insurance	
and	adequate	living	conditions.”14 Berlusconi introduced the measures with the 
following words:
 “The state has to return to being the state … The security measures will allay the  
	 fear	that	citizens	have	…	It	is	their	[citizens’]	right	not	to	be	afraid	anymore.”15
The reader should note that the programmatic message actually advances a 
definition	of	citizenship,	the	state	and	their	relations.	At	first	glance,	the	message	
might appear simple, namely, the national state as protector of its citizens. 
However,	as	such,	the	national	state	also	defines	citizenship	in	terms	of	who	
is/is	 not	 a	 citizen.	As	 is	well	 known,	 in	 the	European	 tradition	of	 national-
state	 formation,	 that	 definition	 is	 based	 on	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 national	 “people”.	
I will return to this point below. What one might overlook in Berlusconi’s 
pronouncement is the particular relationship between citizens and state.
Citizens	have	the	right	“not	to	be	afraid”,	to	feel	secure.	The	state	has	the	
duty	to	“ally	the	fear”,	to	protect	its	citizens.	While	the	citizens	by	implication	
are	identified	as	nationals	–	namely	as	citizens	of	the	Italian	state	–	the	vision	
of citizenship advanced is solely a passive one. Conversely, the state in this 
vision is the active entity – it is the absence of activity that constitutes the 
absence of the state – and its activity is clearly viewed as concerning “law 
and	 order”.	 It	 is	 perhaps	 unfair	 to	 read	 too	much	 into	 (any)	 programmatic	
statement.	Nevertheless,	 I	would	 like	 to	 stress	 that	 underlying	Berlusconi’s	
wording, whether he would agree with it or not, lies an entire tradition of 
political	thought	on	the	state	and	its	(non-)relation	to	citizenship.
The	tradition	upon	which	Berlusconi,	again	perhaps	willy-nilly,	draws	can	
be	identified	as	Hobbesian.	It	is	characterized	by	a	strong	vision	of	the	state	as	
the provider and enforcer of public order. In this tradition, there are in fact no 
citizens,	only	subjects.	The	right	that	Berlusconi	invokes	–	the	right	not	to	be	
afraid	–	is	the	Hobbesian	right	of	subjects	as	wardens	of	the	state.	In	order	to	
fulfill	the	role	of	a	warden,	the	state,	in	turn,	must	be	the	guarantor	and	protector	
of	security;	it	must	itself	be	a	“security	state”.16 There is a clear divide here 
14	 	 “Berlusconi	unveils	 anti-crime	measures	 for	 Italy”,	 International	Herald	Tribune,	May	21,	
2008; http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/05/21/europe/italy.php; last accessed: September 13, 
2008.
15	 	 “Berlusconi	unveils	 anti-crime	measures	 for	 Italy”,	 International	Herald	Tribune,	May	21,	
2008.
16	 	In	its	classical	Neo-Marxist	formulation,	the	term	security	state	designated	the	articulation	of	
“welfare”	and	“surveillance/policing”	functions	of	the	state	in	late	Fordism	(Hirsch	1980).
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between	“citizens”	and	“state”.	The	central	function	of	protection	and	security	
provides	 the	 state	with	 absolute	 defining	power	 in	 this	 regard.	Berlusconi’s	
advocated	return	is	one	in	which	the	state	turns	into	a	“pater	familias”	(head	of	
the household) and citizens are returned to the status of frightened children. The 
family context, in turn, does not allow other meanings of citizenship to enter 
the	vision	and	the	state	is	clearly	defined	in	time	and	place.	The	implication,	
some	might	call	it	the	logical	conclusion,	is	that	the	state	ends	up	defining	its	
role only in terms of itself. The provision and enforcement of public order 
turns into the state’s interest in its own stability and survival. This should give 
one	pause	when	considering	the	democratic	credentials	of	the	nation-state	in	
this regard, a point to which I will return shortly.
It is therefore quite logical that Berlusconi’s advocated return of the state has 
as one of its central policy measures a census of the Italian Roma population. 
While censuses are today mostly seen in the context of data gathering for public 
policy	making	(a	state	needs	 to	know	about	 the	population	 living	within	 its	
territory), there has always been the suspicion that this type of population data 
gathering also can be used to control a population. In this more critical view, the 
administrative	state	is	closely	linked	to	the	surveillance	state	(the	“big	brother”	
of	1984)	and	by	implication	to	the	Hobbesian	security	state	tradition.	Public	
order	in	order	to	be	achieved	needs	“objective”	information	(the	facts).	Those	
facts are especially needed about all that is or could be potentially threatening 
to the public order.
For	the	Roma	to	become	the	quasi-catalyst	for	and	addressee	of	this	vision	
was not at all accidental. There is, so to say, a foundation to build on and it is 
to this foundation that I will now turn.
2.2 The Roma paradigm
It	 is	estimated	 that	 there	are	around	150,000	Roma	living	 in	Italy	 today.	Of	
those, it is further estimated that “about half of them are Italian citizens, while 
20-25%	are	from	European	Union	countries,	chiefly	Romania.	Most	Roma	live	
in	the	Northern	parts	of	the	country”	(European	Roma	Rights	Center	2008,	p.	
9). Italy’s entire population today is estimated at almost 60 million. To put the 
Roma population number even further into perspective, there are anywhere 
between 6 to 11 million Roma, Sinti, and Travellers living in the world, 
about	5	 to	 slightly	over	9	million	 in	Europe,	with	 the	 largest	EU-European	
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Roma	population,	anywhere	from	535,140	to	2.5	million,	living	in	Romania.	
Whichever number one reckons with, Italy’s Roma population is clearly among 
the very smallest.17
Yet	 numbers	 or	 “hard	 data”	 –	 reality	 (or	 rather:	 realities)	 –	 have	 never	
been the issue in the relations between Roma, Sinti, and Travellers and the 
societies they travelled through and lived in. It has always been the assumption 
of	a	certain	“presence”,	encapsulated	in	the	evocative	term	“gypsy”,	that	has	
guided those relations. Thus, in order to come to terms with why an estimated 
150,000 people in a population of almost 60 million have elicited such a strong 
response, it is fruitful to ask what exactly has made and continues to make 
Roma,	 Sinti,	 and	 Travellers	 into	 both	 such	 an	 identifiable	 and	 identifiably	
“different”	population.18  Indeed, when asked about the then existing tensions 
between	 Italy	 and	 Romania,	 some	 (ethnic)	 Romanian	 interview	 partners	
maintained	that	the	Roma	were	in	fact	“a	European	problem”.19 And there is 
some	truth	in	that	assertion.	However,	that	truth,	as	will	become	clear	below,	
can hardly serve as an excuse for the Italian government’s measures and the 
Romanian government’s initial lack of concern about those measures. While I 
will address in the next section the Romanian context, the present section aims 
to	come	to	terms	with	what	is	behind	the	so-called	“problem”.
The	very	language	of	a	“problem”	one	should	note	underlies	and	legitimizes	
policies	of	“othering”	–	from	neglect	to	abuse	and	beyond	–	and	as	such	in	fact	
17	 	It	is	notoriously	difficult	to	provide	an	accurate	headcount	of	any	population.	The	difficulties	
are	compounded	in	the	case	of	ethnic	identification,	which	is	usually	done	via	self-identification	
in census data collection and therefore turns even more problematic in the case of Roma, Sinti 
and Traveller populations where the identity clearly carries a stigma within the broader society 
(Zamfir	and	Zamfir	1993,	pp.	52-56).	If	one	uses	official	census	data	or	highest	estimate	numbers,	
Turkey	has	the	largest	Roma	population	in	Europe	and	therefore	the	world	(yes,	this	author	counts	
Turkey	as	European).	For	Romanian	data,	see	table	40,	Recensământul	Populație	ʂi	al	Locuințelor	
2002,	available	from	the	Romanian	National	Institute	of	Statistics	(INSSE)	at:	http://www.insse.
ro/cms/files/RPL2002INS/vol1/tabele/t40.pdf.	A	 good	 overview	 of	 the	 population	 data	 (census	
and	estimates	from	various	sources)	is	provided	by	the	Wikipedia	entry	for	“Romani	people”	at	
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Romani_people. As usual, even with serious Wikipedia entries data 
and	numbers	should	be	rechecked.	The	3-5	million	estimate	given	at	one	point	in	the	entry	write-
up for Turkey is a fantasy number: the Christian Science Monitor article cited in support uses this 
estimate on its page 2 without any indication where that number came from, see: http://www.
csmonitor.com/2008/0609/p20s01-woeu.html?page=1.
18	 	 The	 term	 Roma	 refers	 to	 a	 specific	 community	 (albeit	 the	 largest	 one)	 within	 the	 larger	
population and will continue to be used exclusively for the purposes of this paper, unless required 
by	context	and/or	analytic	point	to	be	made	(see	text	further	below).
19  That one was able to notice considerable exacerbation in the voices of my ethnic Romanian 
interview partners when asked about the issue should be noted already as a sign of what will be 
discussed in this paper further below. 
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obfuscates	the	complex	realities	that	are	at	issue.	In	the	first	place,	one	needs	
to point out that all European societies have historically not been hospitable 
to	“the	gypsies”,	with	suspicion	and	persecutions	as	the	norm,	leading	in	fact	
to	 one	 of	 the	 (almost)	 forgotten	 chapters	 in	 Germany’s	 National	 Socialist	
population	 control	 and	 extermination	 policies	 (Fraser	 1992,	 pp.	 257-270).	
Furthermore,	hidden	from	view	through	this	othering	are	the	people	themselves,	
their	actual	existence,	the	existing	differences,	and	the	specific	problems.	What	
has	been	termed	“the	gypsies”	and	the	individual	figure	of	“the	gypsy”	(either	
in its male or female version) as identity templates actually refuse to accept 
difference. The designated/labeled population in reality falls into numerous 
groups, tribes, and families whose members can and do live under a variety 
of	circumstances.	Besides	 the	broad	distinction	between	Roma	 (eastern	and	
southeastern	 Europe)	 and	 Sinti	 (western;	 mostly	 German	 speaking	 areas)	
one	encounters	the	Manouche	(France	and	French	language	areas),	 the	Calé	
and	Gitanos	(Spain	and	southern	France),	the	Ciganos	(Portugal)	and	various	
smaller	 groups	 in	Western	 and	 Northern	 Europe	 and	 a	 pastiche	 of	 smaller	
(Roma)	 group-divisions	 across	 southeastern	 Europe	 (including	 Hungary).	
Dialects,	family	relations,	settlement	patterns,	and	vocations	account	for	and	
mark the differences that the Romani people acknowledge among themselves 
(Fraser	1992,	pp.	290-299).	This	variety	can	and	does	include	various	degrees	
of	what	is	referred	to	as	“integration”	–	in	its	usually	simplistic	fashion:	the	
condition	in	which	individual	members	are	not	(easily)	recognized	anymore	
as	members	 of	 a	 specific	 group	 identity	 and/or	 in	which	 the	 group	 identity	
has become a folkloric pastime. In this sense, the process of othering creates 
a	monolithic	entity	out	of	multiple	presences,	their	realities,	and	their	specific	
problems.
The truly unsettling power of othering, however, lies in the fact that it is the 
basis	for	prejudicial	views	that	in	the	event	become	enshrined	in	attitudes	and	
public	policies,	and	thereby	create	prejudice-reinforcing	realities.	Historically,	
this	mechanism	is	of	course	well	known	and	documented	in	all	cases	of	so-
called	minority	groups.	In	the	case	of	the	travelling	families,	dubbed	“gypsies”	
in	English,	who	entered	west-central	Europe	 from	 the	 southeast	 and	east	 in	
the	 early	 to	mid	15th	 century,	 the	 then	 existing	 socio-economic	 institutions	
assigned to them particular leftover roles that could not help but reinforce the 
imagery	of	the	“fahrendes	Volk”	(travelling	people):
 …the guilds regulated crafts and trades, commerce was also tightly controlled, 
 and peasants were not in the habit of employing casual labour, so what 
 was left for Gypsies as a livelihood was limited to small services and minor 
	 trading	and	entertainment	(Fraser	1992,	p.	81).
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The	particular	socio-economic	place	assigned	to	those	travelling	families,	while	
reinforcing	the	imagery,	does	not	in	itself	explain	the	political-cultural	impact	
the families had on those societies, an impact that led to the creation of the 
gypsy	image	and	imagery.	What	is	missing	from	the	socio-economic	diagnosis	
of	“leftover	roles”	is	the	realization	of	the	profound	changes	that	had	begun	
to	 transform	 the	 western	 European	 political	 and	 socio-economic	 landscape	
at	 the	 time.	For	present	purposes,	 it	 is	enough	 to	 remind	 the	reader	 that	 the	
early	to	mid-15th	century,	the	late	Middle	Ages	leading	into	the	Renaissance,	
was	a	period	in	which	the	pastiche	of	Medieval	“overlapping	authorities”	(H.	
Bull) gave way to centralized states, settlement patterns became differentiated 
into town/country fault lines, a new commercial order was on the rise, and 
an age of discovery was about to be ushered in. After the rather tumultuous 
14th	century,	the	15th	century	saw	Europe	not	only	recover,	but,	at	least	in	its	
western	parts,	set	out	on	the	road	we	now	associate	with	the	term	“modernity”.	
It is in the context of these crucial changes that one needs to place the advent 
and	“discovery”	of	the	travelling	families.
For	 centuries,	 “Europe”	 had	 been	 a	wide-open	 space,	 defined	 and	made	
by	 successive	 waves	 of	 migration,	 fluctuating	 internal	 settlement	 patterns,	
and	decentralized	(not	 to	say	disorganized)	political	authority.	The	curiosity	
with	which	the	travelling	families	were	initially	viewed,	the	defining	question	
of	 their	 religious	 belonging	 (heathen	 or	 baptized),	 the	 letters	 of	 protected	
passage	they	(usually)	received	from	authorities,	all	attest	to	the	fact	that	they	
initially were not seen as completely alien in their way of life. Indeed, the 
travelling families themselves were able to claim the conventions of the times 
(pilgrimages,	atonement)	for	being	accepted,	for	receiving	safe	passage,	and	
for	receiving	money	(given	as	alms	to	them).	Even	the	initial	 imagery	itself	
drew	on	what	Europeans	thought	they	knew	at	the	time:	the	“eastern	lands”	as	
point	of	origin,	and	the	Tartars	as	closest	(and,	of	course,	negative)	comparison	
in appearance. Although the comparison to the Tartars already points to a 
decidedly	negative	impression	(but	one	should	note	the	historical	difference	–	
the	invading,	powerful	“God’s	scourge”	–	in	this	sense),	magic	and	especially	
future	telling	did	not	negatively	impact	the	impression.	On	the	contrary,	at	a	
time in which Christian belief, science, and magic still interacted freely in an 
everyday manner, fortune telling was an accepted activity and was highly, even 
officially,	sought	out	(Fraser	1992,	pp.	60-84).20
20	 	For	a	general	history	and	discussion,	see	Kieckhefer	(2000).
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The encounter became unsettling to the western Europeans, the more they 
began to see themselves as settled, the more spatial boundaries became 
politically-administratively	accepted,	and	the	more	political	authorities	were	
actually able to create and enforce a public order on their territories. What had 
been seen before as part of a lived experience became alien, even threatening: 
an echo of a past that western Europeans were leaving behind. Moreover, in 
the	centuries	that	were	to	follow	the	first	encounters,	not	being	settled,	having	
no	 “home”	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 a	 continuous	 place	 of	 settlement,	 and	 travelling	
freely the countryside instead became associated with the worst aspects of 
life experiences: war, brigandism, crime, and poverty. It did not help that the 
accepted, lived relations between Christian belief, science, and magic became 
shattered	and	were	replaced	with	a	rationalized	(purged)	Christianity,	on	the	
one	hand,	and	an	adherence	to	a	rational,	empirical	scientific	method,	on	the	
other. Magic became trickery and as such was regarded either with shame 
(by	those	who	still	consulted	a	fortune	teller)	and	disdain	and	was	persecuted	
(purged)	by	the	authorities.	The	idea	of	a	public	order	and	the	perceived	and	
experienced threats to that public order began to determine the image and 
imagery	of	“gypsies”.	Physical	differences,	especially	the	dark	skin,	became	
the outwardly visible signs of, and a powerful trigger mechanism for, the 
imagery itself.
This	development	of	the	image	and	imagery	of	“the	gypsies”	and	“the	gypsy”	
in	relation	to	the	public	order	only	intensified	with	the	three	“revolutions”,	the	
democratic,	the	national,	and	the	industrial,	of	what	E.	J.	Hobsbawm	has	called	
“the	long	nineteenth	century”.	With	the	creation	of	national	states	and	industrial	
societies, there was no social space anymore for travelling families: national 
states drew on a recognized and united territory with stable populations for 
legitimacy and support, while the new capitalism created class relations based 
on ownership, markets, and contracts. Rationality and reason, in turn, became 
the cultural foundations of the new public order. While in earlier centuries, 
the western European imagination could still draw on some lived experiences 
for some instances of recognition and acceptance, the new public order that 
developed	in	(western	and	central)	Europe	cast	“gypsies”	and	“the	gypsy”	into	
the role of the complete other.
Thus,	what	“the	gypsy”	life	represents	today	is	an	alternative	paradigm	to	
the nationalized and modernized existence in the European political and social 
space.	The	 act	 of	 travelling	 in	 this	 context	 signifies	more	 than	 just	 a	mere	
movement from a point A to a point B. It is outside of the recognized time/
space	linearity	with	its	defined	reasons	(the	business	trip,	the	pleasure	cruise)	
and as such represents a challenge not only to the existing political and social 
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boundaries, but to the very conception of what it means to be modern and what 
it means to be European. The contemporary Italian view underlines this, as 
“nomads”	has	become	an	often-used	term,	including	in	government	circles,	to	
describe the Roma population.21 As nomads, the Roma are seen as having more 
in common with African tribal herdsmen than with Italian citizens. The Italian 
policy-reaction	in	this	sense	not	only	can	be	seen	as	drawing	on	the	Hobbesian	
tradition of the security state, but in fact also reproduces some of the key 
measures	in	European	national	state	formation:	population	identification	and	
control	via	a	census	and	assertion	of	control	over	a	defined	territory	as	social	
space	via	policing,	all	in	the	name	of	public	order	and	security	(Silver	2005).
At this point, the interrelations of the argument developed thus far begin 
to crystallize. As noted, the European Union has become a united and as such 
wide-open	space	in	which	the	national	boundaries	in	principle,	but	depending	
on	 policy	 area,	 have	 ceased	 to	 exist.	 The	 development	 of	 a	 EU-European	
citizenship	in	this	wide-open	context	relies	heavily	on	non-nationally	bound	
forces:	normative	commitments,	market	relations,	multi-level	governance,	and	
integration through law. It would therefore be tempting to conclude at this 
point that Berlusconi’s advocated return of the state is a deeply anachronistic 
and	as	such	flawed	construct	and	that	the	Roma	in	fact	are	part	and	parcel	of	
what	 it	means	 to	be	European	 today,	 including	 the	challenge	 that	 their	non-
nationalized	 identity	 presents	 to	 the	 still	 existing	 national-state	 framework	
within the Union. The historical irony in this development should not be lost. 
Indeed, before going into a general concluding perspective, it bears to discuss 
the Romanian side of the Roma paradigm. As will be shown, the historical 
irony only deepens.
The	 non-nationalized,	 non-modernized	 identity	 –	 again:	 an	 alternative	
paradigm in the creation of a European political and social space – one might 
simply	suppose	also	guides	the	(ethnic)	Romanian	response	to	the	Roma	as	a	
“problem”.	As	 the	EU-member	 state	with	 the	 largest	Roma	population,	one	
might surmise that in Romania the dynamic of othering is especially relevant 
and potentially especially virulent in its negative impact on Romanian/Roma 
relations. While this is the case, it is not all that needs to be pointed out in the 
Romanian case. What follows is a discussion that aims to explain both: the 
initial	lack	of	a	national-political	response	to	the	Italian	measures	and	the	way	
in	which	the	Romanian	response	was	finally	framed.
21  “All’UE anche il rapporto sul censimento dei campi nomadi – Rifugiati: il governo approva il 
decreto”	(also	therein	cited	Interior	Minister	Maroni	using	the	term	nomads),	Corriere	della	Sera,	
August	 1,	 2008;	 http://www.corriere.it/politica/08_agosto_01/rifugiati_decreto_ue_0d29b4fe-
5fb4-11dd-8d8f-00144f02aabc.shtml.
“A Finger for Berlusconi”: Italy’s anti-immigration/anti-crime measures, 
Romanian realities, and the poverty of European citizenship
PIFO Occasional Papers No. 4/2009 | Seite 22
2.3 Romanian realities
Romanian President Traian Basescu’s response to the Italian measures came at 
a press conference after his crisis visit to Rome:
 Romanian citizens, irrespective of their ethnic background, are citizens of the  
	 European	Union…	They	[Roma]	are	our	citizens…		Romanian	citizens	are	
 citizen of the European Union and are to be treated according to the standards 
 of the European Union.22
At	first	glance,	the	response	might	read	wonderfully	inclusionary,	full	of	that	
peculiar European promise which has animated the debate about European 
integration in general and the EU’s eastern enlargement in particular. 
However,	upon	closer	inspection,	one	cannot	help	but	realize	a	peculiar	double	
formulation, which the speaker apparently deemed necessary in order for 
his	 claim	 to	 be	 properly	 understood.	 First,	 Roma	 receive	 their	 identity	 and	
rights	 only	 by	 their	 identification	 as	Romanian	 citizens.	 Furthermore,	 in	 its	
paternalistic	 formulation	 (“[t]hey	 are	 our	 citizens”	 [emphasis	 added]),	 the	
identification	cannot	help	but	turn	Roma	into	wardens	of	the	Romanian	state	
and not citizens in the modern, active sense of the term. Indeed, throughout the 
press conference, Basescu in his responses accepted that there was a “Roma 
problem”,	even	to	the	point	of	offering	the	Italian	government	help	in	dealing	
with it.
At the same time, Romanians themselves apparently are in need of a larger 
identification	in	order	to	justify	and	achieve	an	identity	and	protective	rights:	
“Romanian citizens are citizens of the European Union and are to be treated 
according	 to	 the	 standards	of	 the	European	Union”.	To	put	 it	more	 sharply,	
not only do Roma receive their identity and rights in the context of a granted 
belonging, but also the very identity and rights of Romanians as citizens of the 
European Union has to be asserted in order to make the claim for the Roma 
population in question.
This double formulation, I now wish to argue, points us to a peculiar 
Romanian	 political-cultural	 insecurity	 about	 the	 claim/status	 of	 Romanian	
membership	within	the	Union.	As	discussed	in	the	above,	from	a	formal-legal	
standpoint a European Union citizenship simply does not exist. Citizenship 
continues	to	be	based	in,	defined	and	legitimized	by	each	member	state	as	a	
22	 	Press	conference	with	Berlusconi	during	Basescu’s	visit	in	Rome,	July	31,	2008;	http://www.
presidency.ro/?_RID=det&tb=date&id=10108&_PRID=ag.	“Roma	–	Basescu:	Romania	does	not	
approve	Italian	Measures,”	AGI	News	On,	July	31,	2008;	http://www.agi.it/english-version/italy/
elenco-notizie/200807311756-cro-ren0084-art.html.
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matter	of	a	decidedly	nationally	defined	sovereignty	and	membership.	However,	
citizenship	has	also	become	part	of	“integration	by	stealth”	(Majone	2005)	and	
both Community and intergovernmental regulation have spilled over into the 
dimension	of	citizenship	as	defined	through	rights.
If the policies related to and based on the four freedoms within the Union 
can	 be	 said	 to	 ground	 a	 EU-citizenship,	 then	Romania	 (and	 also	 Bulgaria)	
received from the beginning a rather exclusionary treatment in this regard. 
Romanian	citizens	do	not	yet	enjoy	the	freedom	of	movement	and	residency	
in	 respect	 to	 the	majority	of	older	EU	member	states	 that	all	other	member	
state	 citizens	 possess.	 Furthermore,	 Romania	 was	 placed	 under	monitoring	
in	Justice	and	Home	affairs	matters	as	widespread	and	high-level	corruption	
in	 conjunction	with	organized	crime	were	 identified	by	 the	Union	as	 issues	
lacking crucial initiatives and reforms. And besides corruption and organized 
crime, the treatment of orphaned and street children and the position and 
treatment of ethnic minorities in Romania have been and continue to be key 
concerns in Romanian/EU relations.
(Ethnic)	Romanian	interview	partners	were	quick	to	point	out	that	they	did	not	
experience	or	are	not	experiencing	prejudicial	treatment	within	the	institutions	
and the policy process of the Union, and I see no reason to completely distrust 
that	response.	For	by	and	large,	the	institutions	and	the	process	are	known	to	
be	more	Europeanized	than	they	usually	receive	credit	for.	Policy-	and	expert-
driven	 in	 its	 internal	 dealings	 and	 consensus-oriented	 at	 the	 national	 level,	
there	simply	is	no	room	in	Brussels	for	a	personalized	venting	of	prejudicial,	
let alone racist, attitudes. Such attitudes would in effect immediately disqualify 
their	proponent,	making	it	harder,	if	not	impossible,	to	influence	process	and	
policy-outcomes.	Also,	to	be	clear	at	this	point,	Romania,	even	almost	20	years	
after the toppling of the Ceausescu regime in 1989, continues to be plagued 
by fundamental problems. Corruption in Romania exists at the highest levels 
and is in general a debilitating problem for the country. As one of the by far 
poorest member states, all social services in Romania continue to suffer, which 
obviously continues to affect negatively all those in society that need help 
the most. There can also be no question that the Roma as an ethnic minority 
group	continues	to	suffer	from	both	neglect	and	prejudice,	with	poverty	and	
acts of violent treatment by both ordinary citizens and public authorities as 
consequences; a status that differs fundamentally from the status of other ethnic 
minority	groups	in	Romania.	In	short,	an	objective	dimension	to	the	treatment	
of Romania as a new member state within the EU exists that needs to be at least 
acknowledged	before	passing	any	concerned	judgment	about	prejudicial	and	
exclusionary EU measures against Romania in this regard.
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Having	 acknowledged	 that	 there	 is	 an	 objective	 dimension	 to	 the	 issue	 of	
Romania’s treatment as a new member state, one is still left with a peculiar 
dimension	 to	 the	 issue.	 It	 has	 been	 easy,	 all-too-easy,	 in	 this	 case	 for	 older	
member	states	and	European	Union	policy-makers	to	claim	special	concerns.	
From	the	very	beginning,	namely	the	“bloody	revolution”	of	1989	that	toppled	
the	 Ceauşescu	 regime,	 Romanian/EU-European	 relations	 were	 conducted	
under the shadow of a decidedly problematic, negative image that Romania 
had acquired over time in the western and central part of Europe.23
The basics of this negative image – indeed: the very imagery – are well 
known. Since Bram Stoker’s confused geography and topography and his 
Victorian	transformation	of	folklore,	not	just	Transylvania,	but	Romania	have	
come	to	stand	for	the	“Balkans”	itself	as	“one	of	the	wildest	and	least	known	
portions	of	Europe”	(Stoker	1979,	p.	10)	replete	with	strange	cultural	practices,	
superstitious	peasants,	 and	abject	poverty	 (and,	naturally,	 those	bloodthirsty	
monsters). In the historical process of getting to know Romania better, the 
initial, Victorian imagery was easily transferred onto the plane of developmental 
differences and as such became part of what was seen as differentiating the 
“Balkans”	and	the	entire	“Eastern	Europe”	from	the	West	(Wagner	2002).
What needs to be emphasized about this negative imagery for our present 
purposes is the imagery surrounding the people itself. Popular imagery in 
Central	and	Western	Europe	did	not	make	any	distinctions	between	the	“gypsy”	
type	and	a	Romanian	type.	If	the	first	encounters	with	the	travelling	families	
(see	above)	were	governed	by	the	negative	physiognomic	image	of	“Tartars”,	
the	type	of	the	dark	haired,	dark	skinned,	“swarthy”	(or	Moorish)	people	was	
quickly	extended	to	the	Romanians	(or	in	its	original	historical	use:	the	Vlachs)	
as well. This image in fact has kept itself alive and well even after the fall of the 
Ceauşescu	regime	and	the	opening	of	the	Cold	War	border.	Indeed,	as	numerous	
instances of mass media coverage and the popular imagination have proven, 
the monolithic image connection gypsy/Romanian continues to be made. This, 
of course, again counters the realities and the differences behind such a term 
as	“gypsies”.	But	 this	 identification	has	also	proven	 to	be	a	 (traditional	and	
recurring)	thorn	in	the	self-image	of	Romanians.
The	“gypsy”	has	become	the	negative	“other”	in	this	sense,	the	bearer	of	all	
negative	associations,	and	as	such	the	reflection	of	the	imposed	(and	enforced)	
otherness	 of	 Western	 making.	 Demarcating	 a	 Romanian	 identity	 from	 the	
“gypsy”	image	is	therefore,	willy-nilly,	a	recurring	topos	in	Romanian	politics	
and culture. This relationship does not excuse the treatment of the Roma 
23  It would really go beyond the concerns of this essay to provide a detailed historical account of 
the development of Romania’s peculiar image.
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population	in	Romania.	However,	it	helps	to	decipher	the	Romanian	reaction	
to	the	Italian	policy-measures	against	the	Italian	Roma	population	through	the	
cultural	context	in	which	the	reaction	took	(had	to	take)	place.
At issue for and in the Romanian reaction was the constitution of a 
“people”.	 The	 Italian	 Roma	 population	 was	 not	 immediately	 recognized	
(even	in	parts)	as	Romanian	citizens.	The	differentiation	between	a	Romanian	
identity	and	a	“gypsy”	identity	has	made	it	difficult	to	acknowledge	citizenship	
as	 such	an	acknowledgement	would	 retransfer	 the	negative	“other”	 into	 the	
self.	Yet	 the	 Italian	policy	measures	ultimately	 forced	such	an	 identification	
precisely because they concerned and threatened the rights associated with 
citizenship	and	thereby	in	effect	did	not	make	a	distinction	between	“gypsy”	
and	“Romanian”.	As	President	Basescu’s	noted	reaction	points	out,	the	Italian	
measures questioned in the end the Romanian citizens’ standing inside the Union 
as	co-equals	to	the	citizens	of	all	other	member	states	and	the	Romanian	state’s	
ability to protect its citizens both in bilateral relations and in EU affairs.
Given the problem of the constitution of a people in the Romanian case, 
the	Romanian	reaction	transferred	the	problem	onto	the	EU-European	plane.	
While	the	national	identity-discourse	is	(still)	unable	to	acknowledge	the	Roma	
as	members	of	the	national	community,	citizenship	as	a	EU-European	rights	
discourse grounded in Treaty obligations was able to sidestep that difference 
and	to	assert	the	principle	of	non-discrimination.	At	the	same	time,	reverting	
to citizenship as a EU principle allowed for the difference to be reasserted as 
a matter of substance. Citizenship for Romanians could be protected and the 
“Roma	problem”	could	still	be	acknowledged	–	as	a	European	problem,	thereby	
avoiding	any	(all-too-close)	identification	with	Romania	and	Romanians.
The	 Romanian	 case	 thereby	 leads	 us	 quite	 naturally	 to	 a	 general	 (re-)
consideration of citizenship as part and parcel of the European integration 
project.	For	if	citizenship	tied	to	each	national	member	state	presents	us	with	
political-cultural	 limitations	 grounded	 in	 the	 principle	 of	 the	 national	 as	 an	
essentialist	 interpretation	 of	 a	 “people”,	 the	 Europeanization	 of	 citizenship,	
instead	of	threatening	nation-state	capacities,	could	be	considered	a	way	out	of	
what is an increasingly anachronistic contraption.
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3. Conclusion: The Poverty of European Citizenship
This essay began with a clash between Italy and Romania during the summer 
and early autumn of 2008 over the treatment of Roma in Italy. The notion 
of citizenship clearly played the decisive part. Both Italian Prime Minister 
Silvio Berlusconi and Romanian President Traian Basescu, as quoted already 
in the above, summoned the term in defending their respective interventions, 
Berlusconi to defend the policies, Basescu to criticize them. Yet in their 
respective	responses,	one	finds	two	different	reference	points.	For	Berlusconi,	
citizens are clearly nationals; Basescu, in turn, emphasizes the European Union 
as	 context	 and	 standard-bearer	 of	 citizenship.	Both,	 however,	 unfortunately	
were	not	far	apart	in	their	respective	assessments	of	a	Roma	“problem”.	The	
difference in their reference points and the shared view of the Roma brings out 
a	fundamental	fissure	in	the	construction	of	a	EU-European	citizenship.
The Italian policy measures that triggered the clash were taken in response 
to increased concerns by the Italian populace over issues of crime and 
immigration.	Yet	the	Italian	policy	measures	relied	on	a	Hobbesian	vision	of	the	
security	state	and	targeted	a	specific	population	group	exclusively	and	therefore	
both vision and policy are at odds with a dynamic of EU integration build on 
transnational	normative	commitments	(including	non-discrimination),	market	
relations,	multi-level	governance,	and	the	rule	of	law.	That	the	Roma	became	
the exclusive target was, however, no accident – it was the logical outcome of 
a historical relationship that, in word and deed, continues to make Roma into 
a	 specific	 “problem”:	 a	 population	defined	 essentially	 as	 (at	 least	 potential)	
threat to a public order. The belated Romanian reaction only underscores the 
view	of	a	Roma	“problem”,	yet	one	also	encounters	another	dimension	in	this	
case.	If	the	view	of	the	Roma	as	a	“problem”	is	shared,	in	the	Romanian	case	
it	 is	 also	a	view	defined	by	Romanian	political-cultural	 insecurities	 about	 a	
second-class	citizenship	for	Romanians	themselves;	bluntly	put,	the	“other”	in	
this case hits too close to home.
I would now like to drive the argument a bit further. This necessitates putting 
the discussions above into an even larger perspective. It also necessitates 
noting	 some	 issues	 that	 need	 to	 be	 addressed,	 issues	 that	 some	might	 find	
too	problematic.	But	flinching	 in	 the	 face	of	complexity	and/or	controversy	
has never been part of the occupational description of the political and social 
sciences.
Among the most powerful and recurring criticisms of the European Union 
is	 the	charge	 that	 the	Union	suffers	 from	a	democratic	“deficit”.	At	 issue	 in	
this	diagnosis	are	two	interrelated	dimensions	that	are	routinely	identified	as	
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creating democracy in the contemporary polity: popular sovereignty as the only 
basis of legitimate government and popular representation as the only basis of 
securing	 the	people’s	voice	and	 interests	 in	day-to-day	governing	decisions.	
Both	 dimensions	 are	 seen	 as	 deficient	 in	 the	Union.	There	 is	 no	 European	
populus	as	such,	critics	proclaim,	that	would	fit	the	bill	of	a	sovereign.	Instead,	
the European people continue to be, and see themselves as, divided along 
national	boundaries	(the	British,	the	French,	the	Germans,	…).	And	for	exactly	
this condition, the existing representational mechanisms within the EU system 
are	either	problematic	or	simply	(still)	too	weak.	The	Council	structure	in	this	
view	 only	 confirms	 and	 reproduces	 European	 integration	 as	 an	 elite-driven	
project	and	the	European	Parliament	continues	to	be	too	weak	in	its	role	and	
influence.
While	one	can	(and	should)	dispute	the	characterization	of	EU	institutions,	
there	is	actually	a	sleight	of	hand	at	work	in	the	democratic	deficit	criticism.	
The central assumption on which the argument is based and from which all 
of its persuasive force is derived, is the assumption that the national state is 
and continues to be the only legitimate and the only functioning form for a 
democratic	polity.	Historically,	the	argument	appears	to	be	sound,	if	one	forgets	
about	all	those	instances	in	which	nationalism	(or	patriotism)	ran	amok.	The	
great	historical	achievement	of	the	idea	of	the	nation-state	and	its	reality,	the	
national-state,	in	this	sense	(and	again	discounting	the	negative)	has	been	to	
create	and	integrate	a	“people”	and	to	provide	it	with	both	the	philosophical-
ideational and the institutional sources and resources for democratic rule. 
Nations	made	modern	citizens	and	national-states	made	modern	democracies.	
It	 is	 the	 implicit	 comparison	 between	 national-state	 and	 European	 Union,	
a comparison in which the Union is then explicitly found lacking the key 
democratic	 credentials	 of	 “people”	 and	 “representation”,	 from	 which	 the	
democratic	deficit	criticism	derives	its	force.
Yet one needs to ask today if national states, and especially including EU 
member states, are so much better at providing and caring for democracy. As 
Bob	Jessop	has	suggested:
	 if	there	is	a	democratic	deficit	in	the	European	Union,	it	may	be	linked	to		 	
	 the	contemporary	form	of	statehood	more	generally,	with	deficits	on	different	
	 scales	reinforcing	each	other	(Jessop	2004,	p.	56).
This	essay,	 if	anything,	has	certainly	made	Jessop’s	case	for	a	 larger	and	as	
such	more	problematic	democratic	“deficit”.	In	the	first	place,	we	have	seen	
that the central point on which both Italian policy measures and Romanian 
reaction converged and hinged on is the vision of a national state and its 
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people. Yet in both cases, the vision itself was found to be highly problematic. 
In the Italian case, the state protects at the price of key democratic principles: 
non-discrimination	and	an	emancipated	citizenry.	The	Romanian	case,	in	turn,	
serves to remind us that the very conception of a people relies in its essentialist 
conception of a national identity on a mechanism of inclusion/exclusion that 
compromises the democratic principle itself.
An answer that emerges from this essay is therefore that the solution to the 
democratic	deficit	in	the	European	Union	is	not	to	be	sought	in	the	realm	of	
member	state	competencies.	Instead,	the	solution	to	the	democratic	deficit	lies	in	
the continuing Europeanization of citizenship. To strengthen democracy in and 
across	the	EU	area,	a	EU-European	notion	of	citizenship	has	to	be	taken	up	in	
earnest, defended and extended – precisely in defense of democratic principles 
against their undermining by member states and against a nationalized policy 
process	that	still	values	political-administrative	elites	over	citizens.	In	short,	
the	solution	in	this	sense	lies	in	Brussels,	and	not	in	London,	Paris,	Berlin,	or	
in Rome or Bucharest.
This,	 in	 fact,	 is	 a	 lesson	 that	 so-called	minority	 groups,	 including	 Sinti,	
Roma, and Travelers, have learned through experience and practice. The 
normative web that has been spun around European integration in order to 
rally	populations,	legitimize	public	policies	and	(yes)	also	in	expression	of	the	
vision	of	a	united,	peaceful	Europe,	is	now	the	web	that	member	states	find	
themselves in when creating and administering rights. It is a web that enables 
both citizens and minority groups to challenge national policies by taking their 
case	to	Brussels	(or,	not	forgetting,	to	The	Hague).	For	a	heterogeneous	group	
such as Sinti, Roma, and Travelers, Europe has certainly proven to be a rallying 
point.	One	might	even	propose	that	the	new	Europe	is	actually	aiding	in	the	
creation	of	something	like	a	unified	identity	in	this	case.
Yet the Europeanization of citizenship also has its price. And we can 
again turn to the Roma dimension of the essay, indeed to the dimension of 
the	 “travelling	 families”,	 in	 order	 to	 see	 this	 price	 clearly.	 The	 opening	 of	
traditional national borders in the context of European integration should not 
be	misconstrued	as	a	return	to	the	European	space	of	the	Middle	Ages	(pace	
H.	Bull).	Instead,	as	noted,	the	openness	presented	is	the	result	of	and	as	such	
regulated by market mechanisms; the four freedoms are not political freedoms, 
but	socio-economic	freedoms.	Only	 the	consequences	of	 those	four	market-
centered	 freedoms	can	be	 said	 to	have	 led	 to	 the	 slow	emergence	of	 a	EU-
European citizenship in the strictly political sense of the term. Whatever may 
or	may	not	be	said	about	EU-European	citizenship,	it	 is	a	child	of	capitalist	
democracy.	And	therein	lies	the	specific	problematic	in	the	case	of	Sinti,	Roma,	
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and Travelers. The question that needs to be addressed is to what extent Sinti, 
Roma,	and	Travelers	can	and	wish	themselves	(!)	to	be	covered	by	a	notion	of	
group	rights	that	aims	to	preserve	a	specific	identity,	an	identity	that	is	clearly	at	
odds	with	the	social	and	economic	space	defined	by	capitalist	democracy.	This	
is	not	about	fighting	prejudice	or	preserving	a	cultural	heritage,	both	of	which	
are	valid	and	necessary	aims	worth	fighting	for.	It	is	about	the	consequences	
of policies aimed to combat poverty, exclusion, and loss of life chances. Even 
if all possible/potential precautions for the preservation and acceptance of 
“difference”	in	different	institutional	settings	such	as	schools	and	workplaces	
were taken, the lived experience of difference in the end would not be the 
same.	A	 “hybrid”	 identity	 inevitably	would	 develop	 even	 under	 the	 best	 of	
circumstances	(and	it	already	exists	for	many).	I	venture	to	say	that	this	would	
not	be	bad,	as	Europe	and	all	Europeans	are	by	definition	“mutts”	(to	use	US	
President	Barack	Obama’s	 self-description),	 even	 if	 nationalistic	 discourses	
would like to maintain otherwise. But this is clearly not for me to decide.
There are, I am afraid, no easy answers to the issues raised in this essay. The 
European Union and the process of European integration thereby only share 
in the present conundrum of democracy and governance, wedged as they are 
between local loyalties and cosmopolitan aspirations. I simply hope that this 
essay has at least pointed out what is at stake in the choices to be made.
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